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STOCKTON v. COMMONWEALTH
241 Va. 192, 402 S.E.2d 196 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
In 1983, Dennis Waldon Stockton was convicted of murder for
hire pursuant to Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(2). Stockton was
sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tion. However, a prejudicial remark was made by a third party in the
presence of jurors during the sentencing phase of the trial. Because
of the remark, the district court judge granted a writ of habeas corpus
and ordered that Stockton either be sentenced to life or granted a new
sentencing hearing. Grant of the writ was affirmed on appeal.
Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988). A new sentencing
hearing in a different venue resulted in a re-imposition of the death
penalty for Stockton. This opinion is on direct appeal from the death
sentence imposed at the new sentencing hearing ordered by the federal
court.
HOLDING
Stockton raised many issues and grounds for relief. Some of
these the court treated in a summary fashion, did not involve capital
penalty law, or revolved around facts peculiar to the case and are
unlikely to arise often. Among the issues raised in the case which will
not be discussed here are the shackling of a defendant at trial, refusal
to exclude a pro-death juror, the right to represent oneself, use of the
guilt-phase transcript at the sentencing hearing and prosdcutorial
misconduct.
The Virginia Supreme Court held that Stockton's resentencing
hearing appropriately fixed punishment at death. Although a number
of errors were assigned by the defendant, the court found none of them
to be valid claims. The court asserted that Stockton was not denied a
fair trial based on several factors. First, the Commonwealth's attor-
ney used three of its four peremptory strikes to exclude blacks from
the venire. Challenge by the defense required the prosecution to
explain its reasons for exercising those peremptory challenges against
blackjurors. The court found those reasons sufficient to be considered
racially neutral. Second, the Commonwealth's attorney used evi-
dence of unadjudicated misconduct by the defendant in establishing
the future dangerousness of the defendant. The court found that
evidence of unadjudicated crimes was admissible to establish future
dangerousness. Finally, the Commonwealth's attorney submitted
evidence to demonstrate the vileness of the crime committed. The
court held the evidence sufficient to support findings of the aggra-
vated factor of vileness in the imposition of the death penalty.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A. Batson Claim
The first error which Stockton asserted was aBatson claim. The
law imposes upon the prosecution the burden of presenting racially
neutral explanations for its peremptory strikes. Batson holds that "the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential
jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black
jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case
against a black defendant." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89
(1986). Upon a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenges
have been exercised with regard to a cognizable group, the burden
shifts to the Commonwealth to present a neutral explanation for
challenging the black jurors. In this case, the judge overruled
Stockton's charge that the challenges were racially motivated. The
judge was satisfied that the prosecutor had stricken the jurors because
of age, education, employment, physical problems and personal
demeanor.
An important tool for practicing attorneys is the use of the Batson
privilege. It is permissible and desirable for a defendant to make the
prosecutor explain to the judge exactly why and how he was exercis-
ing his right to peremptory challenges. This is especially true because
no definitive standard has been established as to what constitutes a
racially neutral explanation. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 111 S.
Ct. 1859 (1991) (holding that the exclusion of hispanic jurors survives
a Batson claim when excused because of first-hand knowledge of the
Spanish language which is likely to preclude reliance on official
translation of Spanish language testimony). Defense attorneys also
should remember that they may exercise the Batson privilegewhen
representing white defendants. The race of the defendant is irrelevant
when a cognizable group has been excused from the venire by the
prosecution. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (holding that
white defendants may also raise and prevail upon the matter as to the
exclusion of black jurors).
B. Unadjudicated Misconduct for Future Dangerousness
The Virginia Supreme Court allows a sentencing jury to consider
evidence of unadjudicated misconduct in determining the future
dangerousness of the defendant; that is, whether he "would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society." Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295,317, 384
S.E.2d 785, 798-799 (1989). On the authority of Spencer, this court
rejected Stockton's claim that the use of unadjudicated misconduct is
not permitted to demonstrate future dangerousness.
Stockton also claimed that such evidence (of unadjudicated
misconduct) was unreliable and prejudicial because it failed to require
proof of the conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the use of
unadjudicated misconduct is allowed, this opinion does not make
clear what proof standard is required. It is important for defense
attorneys to continue to litigate this issue and continue to argue for a
standard of proof through proposed jury instructions. For additional
treatment of this topic, see case summary of Saunders v. Common-
wealth, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
C. Lingering Doubt
The United States Supreme Court has determined that a defen-
dant has no constitutional right to an instruction permitting a sentenc-
ing jury to consider residual doubt as to the guilt of the defendant.
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988). The Virginia Supreme
Court, in accordance with the Franklin decision, held that there is no
right to an instruction on lingering doubt in the Commonwealth based
on state law either. Although attorneys might no longer submit such
an instruction, lingering doubt is in fact a powerful mitigating factor
and, where appropriate, should be emphasized in presentation of
evidence at both phases of trial.
D. The "Vileness" Factor
The sentencing jury in Stockton based its imposition of the death
penalty not only upon the future dangerousness of the defendant, but
also on the aggravated battery component of the "vileness" factor
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based on the evidence that the victim's hands had been cut off.
Vileness is characterized as conduct which was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, deprav-
ity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." Stockton, 241 Va.
at 212, 402 S.E.2d at 207. Aggravated battery has been defined as
"qualitatively and quantitatively more culpable than the minimum
necessary to accomplish an act of murder." Smith v. Commonwealth,
219 Va. 455, 47S, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978).
Aggravated battery in Virginia "ordinarily connote[s] conduct
preceding death of the victim." Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427,
448, 323 S.E.2d 554, 565 (1984). Stockton claimed that the finding
was unwarranted in his case because there was no evidence to suggest
that the victim's hands were removed prior to his being shot. How-
ever, the court found that even if the wounds were inflicted after the
gunshot, the victim would have become immediately unconscious and
death may not have been instantaneous. Either the gunshot or the
dismemberment could have caused death and the Commonwealth is
not required to prove the order of the infliction of multiple wounds.
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130,139-140,360 S.E.2d 196,203
(1987). Further, the court has stated that it is immaterial for the
purposes of the vileness determination whether the decedent remains
conscious during the course of several assaults. Boggs v. Common-
wealth, 229 Va. 501,521,331 S.E.2d 407, 421 (1985). This determi-
nation allows the court to find aggravated battery and vileness even if
the victim is immediately unconscious though death may not be
instantaneous.
The cases cited by the court, however, deal with series of wounds
inflicted upon victims so that absolute order could not be established
conclusively and therefore, the particular wound ultimately causing
death could not be determined. The cases may be applied inappropri-
ately by the Supreme Court of Virginia because the only circumstance
constitutionally reliable to support a death sentence is battery which
either by the quantity of the blows inflicted or by the manner in which
the crime was committed is indicative of an increased degree of
culpability in the defendant. Therefore, the victim's state of con-
sciousness is not truly immaterial in the consideration of vileness as
the court asserts in this case. For additional treatment of this topic, see
Lago, Litigating the "Vileness" Factor, Capital Ddfense Digest, this
issue.
With regard to the "vileness" factor, the United States Supreme
Court has established that the statutory language of the factor alone is
insufficient to guide the jury in a constitutionally acceptable manner
and that a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction or defi-
nition of the factor must be communicated to the sentencer or applied
on appellate review. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980);
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). In Stockton, the court
stated that "a murder-for-hire case imports its own special heinous-
ness." This does not meet the Godfrey standard. Murder-for-hire
should not be considered as part of the statutory aggravating factors
as it is already part of the death-eligible offense. The court, instead,
equates the offense itself with vileness and offers no discussion of the
increased culpability of the defendant based on a qualitatively more
culpable battery.
It is important for Virginia attorneys to seek, pretrial, the narrow-
ing construction of vileness to which they are entitled under Godfrey.
E. Federal Issues
The court also noted that Stockton had requested waiver of the
50-page limit on briefs imposed by Virginia Supreme Court Rule
5:26.
Defense counsel should keep in mind that any federal issues
which are not raised on appeal will not be heard on review. If the 50-
page limit on briefs imposed by the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Virginia is insufficient to cover all issues, a waiver of that page limit
should be requested. Even if the request is denied, a federal court may
be less inclined to find that issues not briefed due to page limitations
are defaulted.
Summary and analysis by:
Laura J. Fenn
SAUNDERS v. COMMONWEALTH
242 Va. 107, 406 S.E.2d 39 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On July 17, 1989, Saunders killed and robbed a man. Saunders
was indicted for capital murder pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-31(4)
(murder "in the commission of robbery, while armed with a deadly
weapon"). An eyewitness to the crime testified at the trial that
Saunders shot the victim and immediately began counting the victim's
money. A while later, at a friend's apartment, Saunders went to the
bathroom to wash the victim's blood off his hands. Another witness
testified that on the day after the crime, she told Saunders that she was
so upset over the crime that she could not sleep; Saunders replied,
"Don't let that bother y'all. I slept like a baby..."
The testimony at trial also revealed that Saunders, while awaiting
trial in jail, admitted to shooting the victim in the back of the head
because "he wouldn't give him the money." Yet Saunders presented
evidence that he killed the victim because he was white, thereby
attempting to show that the murder was motivated by race rather than
by robbery. Saunders attempted to show that the taking of the victim's
money was an afterthought.
At the penalty phase of Saunders' trial, two expert witnesses
testified as to whether Saunders "would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society."
Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.4(C). Saunders' expert witness testified
that Saunders' conduct and comments following the crime did not
necessarily show that Saunders would commit future crimes, while an
expert for the Commonwealth testified that there was a chance that he
would pose a future danger to society. Also during the penalty phase,
three witnesses testified that they had knowledge of Saunders having
committed an unadjudicated murder in the District of Columbia.
The court, sitting without a jury, sentenced Saunders to death
pursuant to the "future dangerousness" predicate. Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.4(C).
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that there was sufficient
evidence to support the conclusion that robbery was Saunders' motive
in committing the murder.
The court also held that the fact finder is free to disregard
conflicting expert testimony as to the "future dangerousness" of the
defendant. The court reasoned that future dangerousness is a factual
issue and that the fact finder must determine the weight to be given to
